Bookmarks tagged hacking and analysis and cheating and counterstrike

Using built in microphones (which capture electromagnetic leakage) to cheat at games over discord (and other voice platforms)
"We show that built-in sensors in commodity PCs, such as microphones, inadvertently capture electromagnetic side- channel leakage from ongoing computation. Moreover, this information is often conveyed by supposedly-benign chan- nels such as audio recordings and common Voice-over-IP applications, even after lossy compression. Thus, we show, it is possible to conduct physical side- channel attacks on computation by remote and purely passive analysis of commonly-shared channels. These attacks require neither physical proximity (which could be mitigated by dis- tance and shielding), nor the ability to run code on the target or configure its hardware. Consequently, we argue, physical side channels on PCs can no longer be excluded from remote- attack threat models. We analyze the computation-dependent leakage captured by internal microphones, and empirically demonstrate its effi- cacy for attacks. In one scenario, an attacker steals the secret ECDSA signing keys of the counterparty in a voice call. In another, the attacker detects what web page their counterparty is loading. In the third scenario, a player in the Counter-Strike online multiplayer game can detect a hidden opponent waiting in ambush, by analyzing how the 3D rendering done by the opponent’s computer induces faint but detectable signals into the opponent’s audio feed."